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# Layered Clausal Resolution in the Multi-modal Logic of Beliefs and Goals

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## Overview

- Motivation: Rational Agents
- The Logic of Beliefs and Goals
- Normal Form Transformation
- Resolution in the Logic



# Rational Agents

*Thus spake FIPA:*

Assume a fixed set  $Ag = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  of agents.

- Each agent is autonomous and can work independently
- It possesses **mental attitudes** – **B**eliefs, **I**ntentions
- It also possesses **K**nowledge and **D**esires (not of interest in this talk).
- Each agent's beliefs, desires and intentions may change with time as it receives fresh input from the environment.
- Each agent tries to realize its **I**ntentions by its own actions or with the help of other agents in the system.

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# Communication

*Thus continued FIPA:*

- Communication is an integral part of agent behaviour.
- Agents communicate with each other to
  - obtain **fresh** information
  - **request** other agents to perform some tasks, that they themselves may not be able to perform.
  - **influence** their beliefs, intentions and desires in various ways.

Agent communications are expressed through **performatives** in an agent communication language (**ACL**).

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## Examples of Agent-like behaviour

- Distributed games – Diplomacy, Age of Empires
- auction protocols – Dutch, English, Vickerey.
- playing the stock market

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## Revision of Mental State

- *Assumption:* Each agent starts off life with a certain finite **B**elief base and a finite **G**oal base which is internally consistent.
- In the *give-and-take* of life its mental state undergoes changes.
- To maintain its *consistency* it needs to constantly **revise** its **B**elief and **G**oal bases.
- It also needs to **reason** about its own **B**eliefs and **G**oals to determine whether there is any inconsistency.

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# Revision Procedure

Function Revise( $S, \phi$ )       $\#S$  is a belief or goal base and  
     $S = S \cup \{\phi\}$ ;                       $\#\phi$  is a new formula  
    return (Contraction( $S$ ));  
End Revise.

Function Contraction( $S$ )  
     $S_0 = S$ ;  $i=0$ ;  
    while ( $S_i \models \mathbf{false}$ ) do  
        Find minimal  $F_i \subseteq S_i$  s.t.  $F_i \models \mathbf{false}$ ;  
         $g_i = \gamma(F_i)$ ;                       $\#\gamma$  is a selection criterion  
         $S_{i+1} = S_i - \{g_i\}$ ;                       $\#$  remove  $g_i \in F_i$  from  $S_i$   
         $i = i + 1$ ;  
    end while;  
    return  $S_i$ ;  
End Contraction.

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## Basic Assumptions

- **B**elief is a modality satisfying the axioms **KD45**.
- **G**oal is a modality satisfying the axioms **KD**.
- **I**ntention is not a modality by itself (**Why not?**) but is instead a derived operator

$$I\phi \equiv G\phi \wedge B\neg\phi$$

skip to Logic of Beliefs & Goals

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## Goals vs. Intentions

- Many authors regard **I**ntention as a modality satisfying **KD** but there is a “side-effect” problem (Cohen and Levesque). If  $\phi$  is *desirable* property to achieve but has an *undesirable* consequence  $\psi$ , then does  $I\phi$  imply  $I\psi$  too?
- FIPA does not define a separate “Goal” attitude. But then it is silent about what an agent should do if it is committed to bring about  $\phi$  even if it believes that  $\phi$  already holds. This problem does not arise with intention as derived from beliefs and goals.

skip KD45 axioms

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## KD45 and KD

$O$  is a modality.

- **K**:  $\vdash O(\phi \Rightarrow \psi) \Rightarrow (O\phi \Rightarrow O\psi)$
- **D**:  $\vdash O\phi \Rightarrow \neg O\neg\phi$
- **4**:  $\vdash O\phi \Rightarrow OO\phi$
- **5**:  $\vdash \neg O\neg\phi \Rightarrow O\neg O\neg\phi$ .

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## Resolution: Propositional Logic

- $\mathcal{P}$  = Set of Atomic propositions,  $p \in \mathcal{P}$ .
- $\phi = p \mid \phi_1 \vee \phi_2 \mid \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2 \mid \neg\phi$
- Conjunctive Normal Form,  $\phi_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge \phi_n$  where  $\phi_i = l_1 \vee \cdots \vee l_{k_i}$ .
- Any formula can be transformed into CNF.

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## Resolution: Propositional Logic

- From sentences

$$l_1 \vee l_2 \vee \dots \vee l_n \text{ and } \bar{l}_1 \vee l'_2 \vee \dots \vee l'_m$$

infer

$$l_2 \vee \dots \vee l_n \vee l'_2 \vee \dots \vee l'_m$$

- From  $p$  and  $\neg p$  infer **false**.

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## The Logic of Beliefs & Goals

$Ag = \{1, \dots, n\}$  is a set of agents.

Let  $\mathcal{P} = \{p, q, r, \dots\}$  of atomic propositions, and constants **true** and **false**

- any element of  $\mathcal{P}$  is in  $WFF_{BG_n}$ ;
- **true** and **false** are in  $WFF_{BG_n}$ ;
- if  $\phi$  and  $\psi$  are in  $WFF_{BG_n}$  then so are  $\neg\phi, \phi \vee \psi, \phi \wedge \psi, B_i\phi, G_i\phi$  where  $i \in Ag$ .

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## Multi-Modal Logic $BG_n$

- Semantics of  $BG_n$  formulas are defined as usual on Kripke structures  $M = (S, L, B_1, \dots, B_n, G_1, \dots, G_n)$
- $B_i$  satisfies axioms **K**, **D**, **4**, **5** and  $G_i$  satisfies axioms **K**, **D**
- convert formulas of  $BG_n$  to a **Normal Form** ( $NF_{BG_n}$ ) using the notion of a **view**.
- **View**  $v$  is a sequence of  $B_i$  and  $G_j$  modal operators.  $O_{1i_1} \dots O_{ki_k}$  where  $O_j \in \{B, G\}$  and  $i_j \in Ag$ .
- Example:  $B_1B_2G_1$  is a view.

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## Normal Form $NF_{BG_n}$

- New symbol **start** such that  $(M, s_0) \models \mathbf{start}$  for any initial state  $s_0$ .
- Formulas in  $NF_{BG_n}$  are of the general form

$$\bigwedge_h v_h : C_h$$

- $v_h$  is a view and  $C_h$  is a *clause*.

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## Normal Form: Clauses

- Clauses are of the following form:

**start**  $\Rightarrow \bigvee_{b=1}^r l_b$  (an initial clause)

**true**  $\Rightarrow \bigvee_{a=1}^r l_a$  (a literal clause)

**true**  $\Rightarrow \bigvee_{a=1}^r m_{B_i a}$  (a  $B_i$  clause)  $m_{B_i} = B_i l$  or  $\neg B_i l$

**true**  $\Rightarrow \bigvee_{a=1}^r m_{G_i a}$  (a  $G_i$  clause)  $m_{G_i} = G_i l$  or  $\neg G_i l$

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## An Assumption

For a “rational” agent  $i \in Ag$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} O_i O_i \phi &\equiv O_i \phi \\ O_i \neg O_i \phi &\equiv \neg O_i \phi \end{aligned}$$

or there cannot be consecutive nestings of the same modality.

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## $NF_{BG_n}$ : Transformation $\tau_0$

the transformation is done in two steps:

$$\tau_0[F] \longrightarrow ( \epsilon : \mathbf{start} \Rightarrow f ) \wedge \tau_1[ \epsilon : f \Rightarrow F ].$$

where  $f$  is a new propositional variable.



## $NF_{BG_n}$ : Transformation $\tau_1$

$x$  is a proposition, main operator on the right side  $\wedge$  or  $\neg$ ,

$$\tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow (F \wedge H)] \longrightarrow \tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow F] \wedge \tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow H]$$

$$\tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow \neg(F \wedge H)] \longrightarrow \tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow (\neg F \vee \neg H)]$$

$$\tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow \neg(F \vee H)] \longrightarrow \tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow \neg F] \wedge \tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow \neg H]$$

$$\tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow \neg\neg F] \longrightarrow \tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow F].$$

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## Normal Form $NF_{BG_n}$ : Transformation

Complex sub-formulas within the scope of  $O_i \in \{B_i, G_i\}$ , and  $F$  is not a literal.

$$\tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow O_i F] \longrightarrow \tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow O_i y] \wedge \tau_1[v O_i : y \Rightarrow F]$$

$$\tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow \neg O_i F] \longrightarrow \tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow \neg O_i \neg y] \wedge \tau_1[v O_i : y \Rightarrow \neg F]$$

where  $y$  is a new variable.

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## Normal Form $NF_{BG_n}$ : Transformation

right hand side has  $\vee$  as the main operator ( $D$  is a disjunction of formulas).

**Case:**  $D$  contains a disjunct of the form  $O'_j$  or  $\neg O'_j$  where  $O \neq O'$  or  $i \neq j$ .

$$\tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow D \vee O_i F] \longrightarrow \tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow D \vee y] \wedge \tau_1[v : y \Rightarrow O_i F],$$

$$\tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow D \vee \neg O_i F] \longrightarrow \tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow D \vee y] \wedge \tau_1[v : y \Rightarrow \neg O_i F],$$

where  $y$  is a new variable.

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## Normal Form $NF_{BG_n}$ : Transformation

**Case:**  $F$  is not a literal and  $D$  contains only the modality  $O_i$ .

$$\tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow D \vee O_i F] \longrightarrow \tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow D \vee O_i y] \wedge \tau_1[v O_i : y \Rightarrow F],$$

$$\tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow D \vee \neg O_i \neg F] \longrightarrow \tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow D \vee \neg O_i \neg y] \wedge \tau_1[v O_i : y \Rightarrow F],$$

where  $y$  is a new variable.

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## Normal Form $NF_{BG_n}$

- Each modal clause may contain modal literals involving only one modal operator.  
Clause  $\mathbf{true} \Rightarrow B_1x \vee y \vee \neg B_1z$  is allowed,  
but  $\mathbf{true} \Rightarrow B_1x \vee y \vee B_2z$  and  $\mathbf{true} \Rightarrow B_1x \vee y \vee G_1z$  are not allowed
- Finally ( $D$  is a disjunction of literals and modal literals only involving one modal operator.)

$$\tau_1[v : x \Rightarrow D] \longrightarrow v : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow \neg x \vee D$$

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
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## Example of transformation

$F = B_i(p \vee \neg B_j(q \vee \neg t))$  into normal form.

$$\tau_0[B_i(p \vee \neg B_j(q \vee \neg t))] = (\epsilon : \text{start} \Rightarrow f) \wedge \tau_1[\epsilon : f \Rightarrow B_i(p \vee \neg B_j(q \vee \neg t))]$$



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## Initial Resolution rules

$$\begin{array}{l} \epsilon : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow (F \vee l) \\ [IRES1] \frac{\epsilon : \mathbf{start} \Rightarrow (H \vee \neg l)}{\epsilon : \mathbf{start} \Rightarrow (F \vee H)} \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} \epsilon : \mathbf{start} \Rightarrow (F \vee l) \\ [IRES2] \frac{\epsilon : \mathbf{start} \Rightarrow (H \vee \neg l)}{\epsilon : \mathbf{start} \Rightarrow (F \vee H)} \end{array}$$

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## Modal Resolution rules

$$[MRES1] \frac{v : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow D \vee m \quad v : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow D' \vee \neg m}{v : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow D \vee D'}$$

$$[MRES2] \frac{v : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow D \vee O_i l \quad v : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow D' \vee O_i \neg l}{v : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow D \vee D'}$$

$$[MRES3] \frac{v : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow D \vee \neg O_i l \quad v O_i : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow D' \vee l}{v : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow D \vee \text{mod}_{O_i}(D')}$$

$$[MRES4] \frac{v : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow D \vee O_i l \quad v O_i : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow D' \vee \neg l}{v : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow D \vee \text{mod}_{O_i}(D')}$$

where  $\text{mod}_{O_i}(D')$  is defined below.

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$mod_{O_i}$

$$mod_{O_i}(F \vee G) = mod_{O_i}(F) \vee mod_{O_i}(G) \quad \text{for } O_i \in \{B_i, I_i\}.$$

$$mod_{O_i}(l) = \neg O_i \neg l \quad \text{for } O_i \in \{B_i, I_i\}.$$

$$mod_{B_i}(B_i l) = B_i l$$

$$mod_{B_i}(\neg B_i l) = \neg B_i l$$

Note the difference in treatment between  $B_i$  and  $G_i$ . In case  $O_i = G_i$ ,  $D'$  must be a disjunction of propositional literals in **MRES3** and **MRES4**.

KD45 axioms

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# The intuition behind MRES3 for $B_i$

1.  $v : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow D \vee \neg B_i l \in view(v)$
2.  $v B_i : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow D' \vee l = m_1 \vee \dots \vee m_k \vee l \in view(v B_i)$

Intuitively 2 is the same as

$$v : B_i(\neg D' \Rightarrow l)$$

i.e  $v : B_i \neg D' \Rightarrow B_i l$ . Further  $B_i \neg D' \Leftrightarrow B_i \neg m_1 \dots B_i \neg m_k$ .  
By the transformation each  $m_i$  is a modal literal involving only  $B_i$ . So finally 2. is equivalent to

$$v : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow \neg B_i \neg m_1 \vee \dots \vee \neg B_i \neg m_k \vee B_i l$$

which may be resolved against 1 to yield

$$v : \mathbf{true} \Rightarrow D \vee \neg B_i \neg m_1 \vee \dots \vee B_i \neg m_k$$

From the axioms of **KD45**,  $\neg B_i \neg B_i \neg F \Leftrightarrow B_i \neg F$ , which means the prefix “ $\neg B_i \neg$ ” may be deleted from those that have such nestings.



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
## Example of Resolution

Suppose agent  $i$  has the belief base:  $B_i(\neg p \vee B_j q)$ ,  $B_i B_j \neg q$ . The question is, whether  $B_i \neg p$  is implied by the belief base. We add  $\neg B_i \neg p$  to the belief base and check if the resolution process results in the clause  $\epsilon : \text{start} \Rightarrow \text{false}$ .

Clauses :

$\frac{B_i(\neg p \vee B_j q)}{1. \epsilon : \text{start} \Rightarrow f}$	$\frac{B_i B_j \neg q}{4. \epsilon : \text{start} \Rightarrow f}$	$\frac{\neg B_i \neg p}{7. \epsilon : \text{start} \Rightarrow f}$
$2. \epsilon : \text{true} \Rightarrow \neg f \vee B_i x_1$	$5. \epsilon : \text{true} \Rightarrow \neg f \vee B_i y_1$	$8. \epsilon : \text{true} \Rightarrow \neg f \vee \neg B_i \neg p$
$3. B_i : \text{true} \Rightarrow \neg x_1 \vee \neg p \vee B_j q$	$6. B_i : \text{true} \Rightarrow \neg y_1 \vee B_j \neg q$	

Resolution :



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## Soundness & Completeness

Soundness and Completeness of method is proved in three parts:

- Transformation preserves the satisfiability
- Set of Resolution rules are sound
- If a set of formulas is unsatisfiable, then there is a refutation using resolution rules.
- The rules are sound and complete modulo the **assumption**. The proof though standard, is extremely long and complicated.

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# Conclusions

- This is an extension of the method of Dixon, Fisher and Bolotov (AI vol 139 pp 47-89, 2002) for the unimodal case of a KD45 modality.
- The method satisfies a “locality” or “**layering**” property viz. that resolution is performed only within the same or adjacent levels of nesting. This allows for a simple representation of the **Information store** as in Benerecetti’s work.
- Many tableau and resolution-based proof systems exist in the literature (too numerous to mention here). So this work is not really an advancement in proof techniques, but is perhaps more useful in
  - determining whether an agent’s information store is inconsistent, and hence
  - in **belief and goal revision**.



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
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