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## Problem Set 5

**Due:** Monday November 8, 2010, in class.

See course information section (on course web page) for instructions and rules on working on problem sets and turning them in.

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**Problem 1.** [40 points] Let  $E: \{0, 1\}^k \times \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l$  be a secure block cipher, where  $k, l \geq 128$ . Let  $\mathcal{K}$  be the key-generation algorithm that returns a random  $k$ -bit key  $K$ . Let

$$\text{Plaintexts} = \{ M \in \{0, 1\}^l : 0 < |M| < l2^l \text{ and } |M| \bmod l = 0 \} .$$

Let  $\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{V}$  be the following tagging and verification algorithms:

algorithm $\mathcal{T}_K(M)$ if $M \notin \text{Plaintexts}$ then return $\perp$ Break $M$ into $l$ bit blocks, $M = M[1] \dots M[n]$ $M[n+1] \leftarrow \langle n \rangle$ $C[0] \leftarrow 0^l$ for $i = 1, \dots, n+1$ do $C[i] \leftarrow E_K(C[i-1] \oplus M[i])$ return $C[n+1]$	algorithm $\mathcal{V}_K(M, \sigma)$ if $M \notin \text{Plaintexts}$ then return 0 if $\sigma = \mathcal{T}_K(M)$ then return 1 else return 0
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Above,  $\langle n \rangle$  denotes the  $l$ -bit binary representation of the integer  $n$ .

Show that  $\mathcal{MA} = (\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{V})$  is an insecure message-authentication scheme by presenting a practical adversary  $A$  such that  $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{MA}}^{\text{uf-cma}}(A) = 1$ . Say how many queries  $A$  makes to each of its oracles, and what is its running time. (The number of points you get depends on these quantities.)

*Discussion.* We saw that the CBC-MAC is not secure when one wants to authenticate strings of varying length. The above is a possible fix, which appends the number of blocks in the message to the message before computing the CBC-MAC. Your task is to show that this fix does not work, meaning the scheme is still insecure.

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**Problem 2.** [40 points] Consider the following computational problem:

INPUT:  $N, a, b, x, y$  where  $N \geq 1$  is an integer,  $a, b \in \mathbf{Z}_N^*$  and  $x, y$  are integers with  $0 \leq x, y < N$   
OUTPUT:  $a^x b^y \bmod N$

Let  $k = |N|$ . The naive algorithm for this first computes  $a^x \bmod N$ , then computes  $b^y \bmod N$ , and multiplies them modulo  $N$ . This has a worst case cost of  $4k + 1$  multiplications modulo  $N$ .

Design an alternative, faster algorithm for this problem that uses at most  $2k + 1$  multiplications modulo  $N$ .

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